The 'Adat' institutionand the Management of Grand Forest 'Herman Yohannes' in Indonesian Timor: The Role of Design Principles for Sustainable Management of Common Pool Resources by Ast, J.A. (Jacko) van et al.
www.conservationandsociety.org
ISSN: 0972-4923
Conservation
& Society
        Volume 12 Number 3 2014
Conservation and Society 12(3): 294-305, 2014
Article
The ‘Adat’ institution and the Management 
of Grand Forest ‘Herman Yohannes’ in Indonesian Timor: 
The Role of Design Principles for Sustainable Management 
of Common Pool Resources
Jacko A. van Asta,#, Anindya Widaryatib, and Mansee Bala
aErasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
bRegional Government of Indonesia, Kupang, Indonesia
#Corresponding author. E-mail: vanast@fsw.eur.nl
Copyright: © van Ast et al. 2014 This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits 
unrestricted use and distribution of the article, provided the original work is cited.
Abstract
Local success stories of sustainable forest management can inspire scientists and decision-makers. This article 
analyses the traditional ‘Adat’ institution that plays a role in the management of Grand Forest Park ‘Herman 
Yohannes’, in the Western part of Timor where the Adat forest management regulation has been formally 
restored. The original set of design principles for sustainable management of common pool resources of Elinor 
Ostrom (1990) has been used in this study as an analytical framework for understanding the role of the Adat 
institution in respect to the forest. In the park, the local community applies Adat for protection and management 
of the forest that has been its home for centuries. It appears that Ostrom’s design principles can be identified in 
the current Adat institution and play a role in the sustainable management of the forest. Although many other 
variables can lead to success or failure of institutions, the original (internal) design principles are still valuable 
as a practical tool for building institutions that are – under certain conditions – able to sustain common pool 
resources. The findings confirm the importance of traditional institutions in successful forest management. The 
study recommends that decision-makers take into account existing traditional management systems that have 
shown long term functionality.
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INTRODUCTION
Institutions within traditional communities have received 
much attention in the debate about sustainable development, 
particularly for the sustainable management of local natural 
resources. History shows numerous examples of communities 
and cultures that were able to survive in close relationship with 
their natural surroundings for many centuries. Within various 
scientific disciplines, researchers have pursued the generic 
aim of finding institutional arrangements that could enhance 
sustainable management of (natural) common pool resources. 
The work of Elinor Ostrom has strongly contributed to this 
discussion. From her we take the concept of Common Pool 
Resource (CPR), defined as ‘a valued human made or natural 
resource or facility, that is available to more than one person 
and subject to overuse’ (Potetee and Ostrom 2002). Earlier, 
Ostrom (1990) identified a basic set of eight design principles 
for sustainable CPR management institutions, that later has 
been adjusted and extended by various authors. Although 
not meant as a panacea for handling the problems of natural 
resources (Ostrom, 2007), the original principles still have an 
important value as a practical analytical tool for understanding 
institutions.
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In this study, the original design principles have been used 
as an analytical framework for an empirical case study of 
the ‘Adat’ institution that is involved in the management of 
Grand Forest Park ‘Herman Yohannes’, in the Western part 
of Timor. The traditional regulation and enforcement system 
of the indigenous community, Adat, has existed in the area 
since ancient times, but was not always applied to the same 
level. After Indonesian independence, the enforcement power 
regarding the forest management was state controlled. This 
became ineffective with the political turmoil in 1998, followed 
by the restoration of ‘Adat-based’ forestry management 
at the beginning of this millennium. The objective of our 
study is to explore which role the design principles play in 
a traditional institution that guides community life including 
forest management. We aim to contribute to the understanding 
of the role that historical institutions can play in sustainable 
management of natural resources.
COMMON POOL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
The modern debate on the understanding of common pool 
resources management was started by Garrett Hardin (1968) 
with his famous article, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’. 
Here commons were characterised as natural resources that 
were neither publicly nor privately owned and free to use for 
all. The element of ownership was considered a key factor: 
‘freedom in commons bring ruins to all’. The presented logic 
was presumed to be general and referring to all commons. 
Hardin’s illustration of overgrazing commonly owned pastures 
received heavy criticism; nevertheless, it is a popular metaphor 
for studies about CPRs, especially in the fields of fishery, 
irrigation, animal husbandry, water management, and forestry 
(van Laerhoven and Ostrom 2007). 
Many authors have long studied how specific natural 
resources are managed or mismanaged at particular times and 
places (Oakerson 1986; Campbell 1986; McCay and Acheson 
1987; Berkes 1987; Ostrom 1990; Agrawal and Yadama 1997; 
Ylhäisi 2003; Ostrom 2005; Hess and Meinzen-Dick 2006). 
There has been particularly much confusion about property 
regimes regarding CPRs. The term ‘Common Property 
Resource’, for example is also frequently used to describe 
a ‘Common Pool Resource’ (Nagendra and Ostrom 2007). 
However, this confuses a resource system – either linked or 
not linked to a property right system - with an institutional 
system, ‘property’. Frequently used property-rights regimes 
are ownership by government (public), by individuals or 
firms (private), or by the community. Another possibility is 
no ownership at all, like the situation Hardin (1968) assumed 
in his illustrative case of grazing pasture land.
Each of the types of property regimes has different sets of 
advantages and disadvantages but at times may rely upon 
similar operational rules regarding access and use of the 
resource (Feeny et al. 1990). Multiple examples exist where 
moving to government ownership (Terborgh 2000; Lovejoy 
2006), private property (Demsetz 1967; Raymond 2003; Ylhäisi 
2003), or community control (Vermillion and Sagardoy 1999) 
has helped users of CPRs to achieve more efficiently short 
term results and potentially long term sustainability. Agrawal 
(2007) focusses in his extensive review of literature on property 
rights and their impact on how ownership rights of forests are 
distributed in various regions of the world. He concludes that an 
optimal use of a CPR cannot automatically be associated with 
a certain property regime. The ‘optimal’ solution that can be 
applied to all fisheries, forests, or water systems does not exist 
(Grafton 2000; Rose 2002; Tietenberg 2002). In the words of 
Ostrom (2007): ‘there are simply no panaceas’.
Without effective institutions for the management 
of harvesting practices however, CPRs may easily be 
overharvested and eventually destroyed (Hardin 1968; Worm 
and Myers 2003; FAO 2005; Mullon et al. 2005; Ostrom 2008). 
Extensive empirical studies in diverse disciplines have found 
that users of resources that invest in designing institutions 
and implementing innovative management systems have the 
likelihood of sustaining these resources (Ostrom et al. 1994; 
Berkes et al. 1998; National Research Council 2002; Dietz 
et al. 2003). Hill (2011) mentions that a practitioner’s model 
significantly needs a foundation platform of recognition 
of rights and interests, a set of effective organisations to 
support the roles of key actors and effective mechanisms for 
working together. Although there are examples of dialogues 
that stimulate conflicts (Idrissou et al. 2011), in general, 
interactive participation of users in creating and enforcing 
rules and conflict resolution is essential (Castro and Nielsen 
2001; Adams et al. 2003; Chicchon 2009). Rules unilaterally 
dictated by powerful institutions or from outsiders have less 
legitimacy and are, unless accompanied with ‘totalitarian’ 
suppression, more likely to be violated (Nagendra and Ostrom 
2007). Likewise, monitoring and enforcement are more 
effective when conducted by insiders. Furthermore, according 
to Ostrom (1990), common properties are often managed on 
the basis of rules and procedures that have evolved over long 
periods of time. Based on all considerations she identified eight 
design principles for institutions for sustainable management 
of CPRs as described below. 
THE PRINCIPLES OF  
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT 
The concept of ‘institution’ is multi-interpretable (Yami et al. 
2009). For sociologists like Berger and Berger (1972), they 
are programs, or procedures that structure human behaviour. 
Plott (1979) defines institutions as ‘the rules for individual 
expression, information transmittal, and social choice’. 
Ostrom also (1990) uses ‘institution’ as a referent to rule in 
the sense of regulation, not in the sense of a principle like in 
a physical law. According to North (1990), ‘institutions (…) 
consist of informal constraints such as sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions and codes of conduct, and formal rules 
such as constitutions, laws, and property rights’. We follow 
this definition, but want to stress that application of sanctions 
(enforcement) and its legitimacy are essential for a successful 
institutional system.
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In Box 1, the eight ‘design principles for institutions that 
characterise local CPRs that have survived for a long period 
of time’ have been described (Ostrom 1990). They have been 
further developed by, amongst others, Anderies et al. (2004), 
Ostrom (2005), and Cox et al. (2010).
Combining the first three principles, helps to solve core 
problems associated with free riding (getting the benefits 
without paying the costs) and subtractability (rivalry) of 
use. They do not by themselves necessarily improve the 
institutional robustness of the management of a CPR, because 
the rules made to solve these problems are not self-enforcing. 
Incorporating monitoring (Principle 4), graduated sanctioning 
(Principle 5), and conflict-resolution (Principle 6) can fulfill 
this important function of enforcement and can increase 
common knowledge and agreement. These three principles 
combined can be seen as a feedback control for resource use. 
They transform information about the state of the system 
into actions that can influence the system. Recognising 
the formal rights of the users to choose their management 
system (Principle 7) prevents those who want to evade local 
systems, by bringing in, questions of legitimacy. Nesting the 
set of local institutions into a broader network of institutions 
(Principle 8) contributes to the robustness of the institution 
and helps to ensure that problems on a higher level of scale 
are also addressed (Anderies et al. 2004). 
Numerous cases, in which the design principles for 
institutions were applied, have been documented (Ostrom 
2005). In order to evaluate the eight design principles 
empirically and consider which theoretical issues have 
been documented since their introduction, Cox et al. (2010) 
examined 91 studies that used these principles. Examples 
of successful management cases which deal with fish 
stocks, like the lobster fisheries in Maine-USA (Acheson 
2003), lands vulnerable to flooding - like the Dutch water 
boards (Kaijser 2002), local collective action in forestry in 
the hills of Nepal (Gautam and Shivakoti 2005), acequia 
irrigation systems in Taos valley, New Mexico (Cox et al., 
2010), and many more. In other cases, the management of 
resources has failed, for example the North Atlantic cod 
fisheries (Finlayson and McCay 1998), the oyster fishery of 
Chesapeake Bay (McHugh et al. 1990), the customary marine 
system of the Tonga Islands (Malm 2001), the irrigation 
system of the Hohokam (Bayman 2001), water systems in 
Ghana (Webb 1991), the basin of the Aral Sea (Glantz 1999), 
and many more. 
Specifically, forest management offers a wide range of cases, 
since all over the world degradation processes for these CPRs 
can be found (Gibson et al. 2000). In South East Asia, the area of 
tropical rain forest has reduced dramatically from 250 million 
hectares in 1900 to below 60 million in 1989 (Poffenberger 
2006). Deforestation rates in Indonesia continue to increase. 
According to the ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations) (2009), the annual rate of decrease in forest area in 
Indonesia was 1.67% between 2000 and 2007. Most of the 
forest damage has been caused by conversion to other land 
uses, specifically agriculture and mining, but timber harvesting 
also plays an important role (Tsing 2005; Szczepanski 2002). 
In many cases where Asian forests are successfully protected, 
indigenous people are involved (Parotta et al. 2009; Rekarsem 
et al. 2008), as in Indonesian East Kalimantan (Nanang and 
Inou 2000) and East Sumba (Tasdiyanto 2007). According 
to Colchester (2000) about 85% of the world’s protected 
areas are inhabited by indigenous peoples. Most of them are 
living in tropical forests and have found a way to sustain their 
surroundings for their goods and services. 
The cases where CPR institutions are successful to sustain 
the resources tend to show the presence of most of the design 
principles (Ostrom, 2005). Cases where CPR institutions have 
failed to sustain resources, tend to be characterised by the 
incorporation of very few of the mentioned design principles 
(Anderies et al. 2004). However, various other factors are 
identified as potential causes for success or failure. The 
resilience and adaptation level of the (ecological/resource 
and social/institutional) systems are important factors here, as 
Olsson et al. (2006) convincingly demonstrate. Agrawal (2002) 
argues that factors, such as the size of the user groups, different 
types of heterogeneity within or between them, and the type 
of government regime they operate within, are important in 
many cases. The studies on the management of commons have 
advanced manifold and go beyond the mentioned original 
design principles, making it more and more complex. 
With a focus on the dynamic interrelationships between the 
design principles and the impact of exogenous variables, cross 
scales, and across levels (Berkes 2002) the incompleteness of 
the original design principles has been empirically proven (Cox 
et al. 2010). The dynamics and contextual factors of CPRs 
make them more complex than the original design principles 
suggest (Agrawal 2002). It leads to a process towards ‘dual’ 
design principles (McGinnis and Ostrom 2010) and further to 
the ‘multitier framework to analyse social-ecological systems’, 
known as the SES Framework (Ostrom 2007). Nevertheless, 
the relative simplicity of the framework of the original design 
principles, with some adjustments in the distinction between 
the social and the physical parts of the system, remains 
crucial for understanding the core of theoretically complex 
institutional design. The original design principles are still 
valuable as a comprehensive and practical tool for a quick 
analysis of the minimal conditions for institutions that have 
the potential to sustain CPRs. Therefore, we employ these 
Box 1
Design principles illustrated by long‑enduring CPR institutions
Clearly defined boundaries for users and resource
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions
Collective-choice arrangements for most individuals  
(information and ability to modify the rules)
Monitoring users and resources
Graduated sanctions for violators
Conflict-resolution mechanisms that are rapidly accessible
Minimal recognition of rights to organise
Nested enterprises, in case of resources that are parts of larger systems
Source: Ostrom 1990
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principles as a framework for analysis of an institution of an 
indigenous community regarding their forest management.
THE INSTITUTION OF ADAT
The Adat is a system with traditional rules and sanctions for 
Indonesian community life. Besides social rules, the institution 
contains rules of behaviour with respect to the physical 
environment (Safitry 2007). Before the introduction of state 
interference, the Adat regime played a crucial role in the 
sustenance of the forest ecosystem. The meaning of the term 
‘Adat’ can be approximated with ‘customary law’, ‘tradition’ 
or ‘well mannered’ (Davidson, and Henley, 2007). According 
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Regulation No. 39/2007, 
‘the Adat institution refers to a social organisation which has 
the objective to conserve and develop the Adat culture based 
on traditional customs’. In its original unwritten form, the 
institution dates back from ancient times. 
Adat is not static; it is a system that develops over time and 
is influenced by local circumstances. During colonisation, 
most of the regulations became codified and acknowledged as 
formal written law. Dutch colonialists used these institutions 
for the enforcement of their interests by inserting it into their 
governmental system. This resulted in parallel legal institutions 
for indigenous people in Indonesia. Between the inhabitants, 
the Adat rules are leading, but as soon as the national state 
level is involved, another legal system prevails, putting aside 
local community regulations. Sczepansi (2002) illustrates 
the negative consequences for Dayak communities in East 
Kalimantan where the system survived in an adjusted form 
after Indonesian independence. The rights of the indigenous 
people in forestry were recognised in the Basic Agrarian 
Law of 1960 (Law 5/1960, particularly in part IX) (Fay and 
Sirait 1999), and they were in 1999 generally reiterated and 
confirmed in the Basic Forestry Law (Law 41/1999). 
In this dual legal reality, the state kept a strong position in 
forest regulation, with strict enforcement of a centralised forest 
concession system, but within the areas, most of the inhabitants 
followed the Adat system. During the regime of President 
Suharto (1966-1998), the abuse of power at the central state 
level led to increasing deforestation rates, also in areas that 
were under Adat management by indigenous communities. 
Due to this, there were fierce protests that followed, which 
in turn contributed to the resignation of Suharto and his 
suppressive system and consequently more democratisation 
and modernisation ensued. These trends had an eroding effect 
on the Adat institution itself; numerous different views entered 
the Adat society and the society began to question the traditional 
rules. The direct result of the disappearance of (suppressive) 
law enforcement by the state was a situation in which outsiders 
could obtain forest resources without any consequences (Tsing 
2005). From 1998 onwards, in the beginning of the ‘reformasi’ 
(reformation) era, lawlessness led to an accelerating loss of 
natural resources (Cszepanski 2002). As the weakening Adat 
legal system only had meaning between the local inhabitants, it 
was unable to defend the forests against outsiders. Due to this, in 
general, Indonesia suffered from a wide range of illegal logging, 
land clearing for agriculture, and cattle grazing (Kant and Berry 
2005; Tsing 2005). Although the content of the regulation did 
not substantially change, the degree of enforcement diminished 
to virtually zero. This process could be stopped, only after state 
enforcement power was allocated to local and regional entities.
THE STUDY AREA AND  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Our case study considers the indigenous community in the 
Amarasi sub-district on Timor Island, one of the 28 sub-
districts of the Kupang Regency in the Province of East Nusa 
Tenggara (Figure 1), which is located 40 kilometres east of 
the capital city of the Province of Kupang. 
The community lives in and around the Park ‘Prof. Ir. 
Herman Yohannes’, one of the 17 ‘Grand Forest Parks’ in 
Indonesia. The park is roughly bounded by four villages: 
Sonraen in the north, Tesbatan in the south, Nekmese in the east 
and Kotabes in the west. It was declared ‘Grand Forest Park’ 
(or ‘Tahura’, from ‘Taman Hutan Raya’) under Presidential 
Decree No. 80/1990. The hilly terrain of the 1900 hectares 
defined as Grand Forest Park has an altitude of between 100 
and 650 meters above sea level. It contains a tropical forest 
ecosystem with high bio-diversity value, including several 
indigenous species (e.g., Timor Deer) (Figure 2). 
The Grand Forest Park is an example of a CPR; inhabitants 
receive benefits from the forest, reducing these benefits for 
others, while overharvesting would eventually lead to a collapse 
of the forest. For many centuries the remote located park was 
Figure 1: Amarasi sub‑district, Kupang, Indonesia
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able to survive in a sustainable way. After the end of the ‘new 
order’ regime in 1998, when the management of the forest shifted 
from the Forestry Agency at regency level to the Conservation 
and Natural Protection Bureau of the Forestry Department at 
Provincial level, a significant part of the forest was changed 
within a few years into barren land. According to the interviewed 
Forest Guard of Herman Yohannes, this happened particularly 
in the periphery area of the park. Only after May 1999, when 
president Habibi’s government passed the Regional Autonomy 
Law (no. 2/1999), provinces could attribute enforcement 
responsibilities concerning the governing of local land areas 
to decentralised institutions. Ministry of Forestry Decision no 
33/2001 formally recognises the rights of indigenous inhabitants 
to the forest. After 2001 the forest has considerably improved. 
According to the respondents, deforestation ended with inserting 
the Adat-regulation into the official legal system.
Those living in Amarasi Sub District (with Oekabiti as the 
capital) consist mainly of the present generation of inhabitants 
from the former Amarasi Monarchy. In 2007, the nine villages 
of the area had 14,772 inhabitants, including 566 migrants 
(Amarasi sub-district 2009). The literacy rate was 84 %, but 
the large majority of inhabitants had only finished elementary 
school. In general, most of the people that are spread over the 
area share the same values and have a common history; they can 
be considered a community. Their culture, language, institutions, 
and knowledge system is locally known as ‘Manekat’. The area 
has been relatively unaffected by cultural change or political 
turmoil. Although, compared to colonial times the leading role 
of the Amarasi King has eroded, the traditional leaders of the 
institution still kept their social status and were consulted for 
mainly social conflicts between members of the community. 
The main leader in the area is known as the ‘Fetor’, assisted by 
sub-heads in each of the 9 villages in the park area. The Fetor 
and his staff originally supported the King.
The present community has the following basic characteristics:
- Dependence on the forest for living
- Low participation in the monetary economy 
- Importance of family and community connections
- Acceptance of the Adat institution and the Fetor that is 
consulted in the case of conflict resolution and enforcement.
In Kupang Regent Decision number 02/2001, the local 
Government and Forestry Department decided to give the 
inhabitants formal communal property rights (‘Tanah Adat’) 
over the land of Grand Forest ‘Herman Yohannes’. With this 
decision, the Adat institution became officially part of the 
Indonesian legal system. Enforcement of the Adat rules is 
recognised, allowing the leaders to put sanctions according 
to the local conventions. 
It is our aim to identify the role that the basic eight design 
principles for sustainable management (Ostrom 1990) play in 
the traditional Adat institution regarding Grand Forest Park 
‘Herman Yohannes’. Since literature, documents or written 
news about the area are scarcely available, we asked the people 
from the community about their experiences. We conducted 
semi-structured interviews with 50 of the nearly 15,000 
inhabitants of the area and we held in-depth interviews with 
12 of the major societal actors in the community. 
The survey with 40 questions was done during June and 
August 2009. The respondents were selected at random, by 
approaching people from the six (out of nine) villages located 
in the Grand Forest Park, that were reasonably accessible by 
road. The lack of respondents from the remote areas of the park 
that do not regularly visit the social meetings brings important 
limitations. Respondents were between 26 and 55 years old 
and most of them appeared to work as farmers. All of them 
were born in the area. In order to avoid social pressure, we 
guaranteed anonymous answers. Although we are aware of 
potential power inequalities, we did not find any indication 
of suppressed opinions, neither from the respondents nor the 
(in-depth) interviewees. 
The in-depth interviews were held with 12 important actors 
in the community, based on their role in the Adat institution (7) 
and the management of the forest (5). The selection was based 
on a stakeholder analysis, performed in collaboration with 
Yacob N. Abineno, head (‘Fetor’) of the Adat institution in the 
Amarasi sub-district (‘Kafetoran’ Oekabiti). All interviewees 
were active in the area for at least 10 years. The 12 key actors 
are listed in Annex 1; some have been portrayed in Figure 3. 
As the key actors that were found played an important role in 
the Adat institution, we cannot exclude a positive bias towards 
the institution. Similarly, the Indonesian state is generally 
perceived in a very positive way here. 
In the following section the Adat institution is analysed using 
the eight design principles of sustainable natural resources 
management that was developed by Ostrom (1990).
THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES AND  
THE ADAT INSTITUTION
Clearly defined user and resource boundaries 
The first principle asks for clearly defined boundaries: (a) of 
the resource i.e. the Grand Forest Park; and (b) of the user 
group of these resources. The resource boundaries are clearly 
identified in the borders of the Grand Forest Park as declared in 
Presidential Decree No. 80/1990. Although the boundaries of 
the park were a top-down decision, they comprise the core of 
the Amarasi community’s traditional living areas. The original 
Adat rules do not indicate borders of the area, but the Regency 
decree gives the full community collective ownership. No 
one is allowed to collect any kind of forest products like trees 
and animals, or does any farming or burning activities inside 
the park except for the yard that surrounds their home (the 
‘Ulayat’). Community members can use the wood and products 
from their yard for their own purposes (for example as building 
material). However there should be explicit permission from 
the leaders and it is required to replant the same amount of trees 
that have been used. According to the interviewed community 
leaders, it is not allowed to sell the trees. These rules not only 
bind the community members, but also the nearly 600 migrants 
who have also been living in the area for many years. Outsiders 
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who enter the park are also obliged to obey the rules, based on 
Kupang Regent Decision number 02/2001. Thus the users and 
resources are very well defined; only the community that owns 
land in the park can use particular resources.
All 50 respondents in the survey knew about the existence 
of the rule not to collect from the forest within the boundaries 
of the Grand Forest Park, except from their own yard. They 
were also aware that the rules have the purpose to keep the 
forest sustainable, guaranteeing future benefits from nature.
Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs
The second principle has two dimensions: (a) congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules; and (b) the rules 
are considered to be in line with the local physical and social 
conditions. When the respondents were asked whether they 
are loyal to the traditional Adat rules, all of them answered 
positively. Two factors were mentioned in this respect: (a) 
the fairness of the possibility to harvest from the (physical) 
areas that are owned by the community, and (b) the origin 
of the rules, based on the (social) traditions of Adat and 
inherited from their ancestors. The interviewed leaders 
mention that their ancestors created a taboo (‘bunuk’): a 
belief that if they destroy the forest, the Spirit will punish 
them through a disaster. Although this threat is not as 
convincing as in earlier times, it makes ‘Herman Yohannes’ 
a sacred forest. Among the migrants who have been living 
for many years in the area, the majority also seem to obey 
the traditional rules. The interviewed leaders claim that 
they mainly do that out of respect for the community, not 
because they believe in the revenge of the spirit. Most 
of the offenders were outsiders and not members of the 
community. It can be concluded that there is a positive 
perception towards congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules. 
Collective-choice arrangements
The third principle refers to the ability of the users to change 
the rules that affect them, and the availability of information 
about the state of the resource. Some indication for this principle 
can be found in the level of participation of the community. It 
can be divided in two: (1) participation in the activities of the 
Adat institution, particularly the resource monitoring system, 
and (2) participation in the meetings such as the counselling 
programme from the government and the solving procedure 
of conflicts. The general invitation to join for all members of 
the community implies the possibility to influence the rules. 
Although theoretically in line with Ostrom’s third principle, 
in daily practice the rules will not easily be changed by the 
common people. These traditions are inherited from a fixed past 
and they are applied by rather conservative leaders. The social 
structure also minimises change, since a request for other rules 
can also be considered a critique to the leaders. 
The grade of participation of community members is 
generally high. As far as the general activities of the people 
are concerned, 92% of the respondents answered that they 
are ‘often’ or ‘practically always’ involved in the community 
activities (Figure 4).
Only 8 % of the respondents rarely participate in Adat 
activities, mostly because they live too far away from the 
main road. Moreover, economic conditions do not allow 
travelling and involvement in Adat activities, although 
these respondents declare that they obey the traditions and 
respect the Adat institution. For the total community the 
non-participating percentage will be higher, since we only 
approached inhabitants of the villages.
Figure 2: Grand Forest Park ‘Prof. Ir. Herman Yohannes’
Figure 3: Community leaders of the Grand Forest Park  
‘Prof. Ir. Herman Yohannes’ (2009).  
From left to the right: Eliasar Tuthaen, Yacob N. Abineno (the Fetor), 
Petrus Kasse, Kornelis Bureran, Elisa Ataupah (Secretary of Fetor)
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As far as the type of participation in meetings is concerned, 
around half of the respondents (52%) are actively involved. 
They explicitly give their opinion in the meetings. The 
others (48%) attend meetings in a passive role; they limit 
their involvement to listening. This group also contains two 
‘observers’: members of the community who also work as 
government officers. They attend the meetings and are involved 
in the Adat activities because they feel attached to the Adat 
institution.  Although we acknowledge the risk that the ‘silent’ 
participants are under pressure to avoid speaking out their 
opinion, we consider a more than 50% active participation 
relatively high. Besides, the general perception amongst the 
respondents that they are applying the rules indicates the 
presence of the third design principle of Ostrom (1990).
Monitoring users and resources
The fourth principle, ‘monitoring’, is related to the active 
role of the population in the monitoring system regarding 
resources (a) and users (b). It contains the monitoring activity 
itself and the condition that the monitoring individuals are 
accountable for their activities or are the appropriators 
themselves. All community members responded to be actively 
supporting the monitoring system. If they observe damage 
to the forest they report that to the head of the village, 
and if they observe the offender, they will also mention 
that. Forestry officers and local government officers also 
monitor irregularities in the forest. The system is specifically 
effective because it is based on a chain of information with 
the following order:
1) A member of the community observes something illegal 
in the forest
2) Information about the case is brought to the head of the 
village
3) The head of the village informs the case to the community 
leader(s) 
4) The community leader informs the case to the forestry 
officers and government officers 
5) Community leaders, forestry officers and government 
officers together try to identify the offending user
It means that monitoring takes place by the members of the 
community themselves, in cooperation with governmental 
officials. When asked about the amount of offences known 
in the last three years (before 2009), the interviewed Forest 
Officer mentions two cases of illegal logging, one case of illegal 
occupancy of land, one case of cattle grazing in the park and one 
case of a forest fire. The chain of information, combined with the 
monitoring system, is indicated to be effective in decreasing the 
frequency of deforestation cases. This is a result of community 
members and government officials working closely with each 
other in the management of the system.
Graduated sanctions
The fifth principle refers to proportional punishment of 
offenders. The Adat sanctions are directly related to the 
King’s Rule of the Amarasi Monarch. The sanctions for 
breaking this rule are applied per incident. Most common 
sanctions are:  
 1)  ‘Nasaeba Nafani Soko Ko’o’: The offender should 
re-plant the forest that was destroyed, plus a fine of 1 
cow and 200 kilograms of rice.
 2)  ‘Nanoni’: The offender should pay a financial 
compensation to the community of up to IDR 500,000 
(around USD 41 in 2009).
In the lighter cases, leaders write a memo with a warning not to 
repeat the committed offense. In the most serious cases, however, 
such as substantial forest cutting, the offender will consequently 
be passed to the legal agencies of the Indonesian Government. 
The respondents consider the sanctions to be fair, but heavy 
enough to have an effect. They observed that the few offenders 
who were punished with these sanctions did not repeat their 
offense. The interviewed leaders stress that the sanctions 
given to the offenders are effective and in proportion with the 
severity of the offense.
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
The sixth principle is related to solving problems both in daily 
community life and in the deforestation cases. According 
to the leaders, most of the conflicts are disputes about land 
ownership between families, but cases of illegal logging 
were also handled. The procedure for these problems is that 
all community members sit in a meeting and, guided by the 
Figure 4: Involvement of the community in Adat activities and meetings
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leaders, come to a conclusion. As they have been practising 
this habit successfully for a very long time, the leaders come 
to the conclusion that its effectiveness is historically proven. 
The absence of larger groups of people with contrasted 
interests prevents conflict acceleration during the dialogue. All 
respondents state that they are convinced that conflicts about 
deforestation can be resolved by the local Adat institution in 
a better way than by the government.
Minimal recognition of rights to organise
The seventh principle underlines the right to self-organisation 
of the community. Recognition of the right to organise protects 
the tradition and the local knowledge of the community. 
Indonesia has legally formalised this principle in accordance 
with the statement of the United Nations (1992) to recognise 
the indigenous capacity and local knowledge. The most 
important laws that provide rights for the community in 
Indonesia are listed in Table 1.
For the community, the laws attribute the right to sustainably 
manage the forest and to use land (‘Ulayat’) for agriculture or 
farming, in principle for a long term period. Although these 
regulations could be easily set aside by the central government 
(as was shown before the reformation era), the community is 
formally provided with the authority to manage and govern the 
area they live in. According to most of the leaders, the people 
perceive that they are part of the governing organisation and 
feel that their rights are respected. Based on the majority of 
the interviewees, it can be stated that the current institutional 
organisation corresponds with the way the people want it to 
be organised.
Nested enterprises 
The last principle refers to the condition that the institution 
should be part of a larger institutional setting. In the Grand 
Forest Park the community has institutionalised a wide set of 
norms, rules, and sanctions to manage the area. As was described 
earlier, it appears that the provision, monitoring, enforcement, 
and conflict resolution are formally acknowledged as part of 
the Indonesian legal system. 
Besides this legal embedding, the Adat institution can be 
considered to be nested in the broader governmental system 
of Indonesia. Many of the actors in the Adat institution are 
at the same time working for the government. When asked, 
they declare that for forestry issues, priority is given to the 
application of the Adat rules before they start enforcing general 
Indonesian law. The formal embedding of the Adat in the 
legal system provides leaders of the villages with authority to 
enforce regulation: to apply the rules, even towards outsiders. 
At the same time the Adat gives legitimacy to the leaders, 
according to the people; something that state officials do not 
always have. This combination of Adat legitimacy and legal 
power of enforcement can be seen as a plausible explanation 
of the successful functioning of the institution.
The other indication that nestedness has been achieved, is the 
government officials inspecting and sanctioning the offenders. 
It makes the Adat rules and the official legal system to be 
perceived as one entity. According to the interviewed leaders, 
these collaborating systems work in a very effective way. This 
is in line with, amongst others, Acheson (2003) who mentions 
that an ideal collaborative management system of resources 
can be gained if the government and the people work together 
in controlling the resource. 
All 50 respondents and 12 interviewees were more or less 
convinced that the government positively works together 
with the community, particularly in solving the cases related 
to deforestation. This can be illustrated with the counselling 
programmes about forestry that the Forest Department 
organises for community members. The interviewed forest 
guard, Joni Tabun (Appendix 1), declared that after the formal 
re-introduction of the traditional rules of the Adat institution, 
deforestation rate in ‘Herman Yohannes’ declined to virtually 
zero. Respondents of the survey confirmed this statement, as 
they all perceive that the state of the forest has considerably 
improved since 2001.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The importance of local traditional knowledge systems has been 
recognised by many countries in the world (United Nations 
1992; Tasdiyanto 2007). By analysing the Adat institution 
on the presence of the design principles of Ostrom (1990), 
we showed that these traditional systems comprise basic 
institutional elements that can also be found in contemporary 
theories about sustainable governance. The almost unanimous 
support of the Adat system by the people we interviewed, 
should be attributed to social constraints (the sanctions, taboos, 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct of the definition of an 
institution), combined with the institution’s historical roots, and 
its embeddedness in the formal governmental structure. Earlier 
experiences with outsiders that plundered the forest, together 
Table 1
Legal basis for the Adat in communities in Indonesia
No The right of the 
community
Constitutional 
basis
Legal basis
1 The right for 
Society Forestry
The 1945 
Constitution 
(UUD 45) Section 
18b article (2) 
and Section 281 
article (3)
Tap MPR No. IX/2001 
UU No. 39/1999 
Kep Menhut No. 
31/2001
2 Property rights 
for the Adat 
on parts of 
the forest 
(Hak Ulayat)
The 1945 
Constitution 
(UUD 45) Section 
18b article (2) 
and Section 281 
article (3)
Tap MPR No. IX/2001 
UU No. 39/1999 
UU No. 5/1960 
Keppres No. 34/2003 
Per Men Agraria No 
5/1999
3 The 
acknowledgement 
of the Adat 
Institution/
Organisation
The 1945 
Constitution 
(UUD 45) Section 
18b article (2) 
and Section 281 
article (3)
Tap MPR No. IX/2001 
UU No. 39/1999 
UU No. 22/1999 
PP No. 76/2001
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with the relatively low level of education of the inhabitants 
could be important situational factors that have strengthened 
the institution’s acceptance rate. 
The community of Amarasi felt a sense of relief that they were 
able to revert to their management system with support from 
the Indonesian government. But more important is that forests 
like ‘Herman Yohannes’ can still be managed in a sustainable 
way. Nevertheless, an institutional system like the one that has 
been described in this paper will certainly not always lead to 
the same positive results in terms of sustainability. Neither 
Ostrom’s principles nor the Adat institution should be seen as 
a panacea. There are numerous other ways that can lead to the 
desired outcomes in terms of sustainability. And we are aware 
that the involvement of indigenous peoples’ institutions do not 
always bring sustainable development. Besides, although we 
did not find indications of suppression, traditional institutions 
often imply the risk of habits that can be considered unethical 
in modern times. 
Furthermore, our research does have its limitations. The 
results are based on perceptions of a limited sample of the 
population, and the respondents are partly biased by their 
role in the Adat institution. We did not have any proof of a 
causal relation between the principles and forest sustainability. 
The question, what exactly caused the better state of the 
investigated forest, has not been answered. Was it due to the 
Adat Institution, the re-established enforcement of State laws, 
or the decentralisation that has been initiated in the reformation 
era? Perhaps also the change in the Indonesian governmental 
approach played a role, or the awareness of the people 
involved. However, according to the inhabitants, the institution 
certainly played a positive role, and it seems plausible that 
when enforcement power is attributed to the local community, 
this status can make a difference in enforcement issues.
Keeping all this in mind, it seems that a form of state 
legitimised self-regulation by local traditional institutions can, 
under certain conditions, be effective in forest management in 
Indonesia. In terms of modern governance, important steps have 
been made towards interactive management (Van Ast, 2000), or 
even co-management (Carlsson and Berkes 2005; Cronkleton 
et al. 2012). With the existing institution as a starting point, it 
could even be possible to avoid many of the disadvantages of 
co-management as described by Castro and Nielsen (2001). 
When government and locals start the negotiation about an 
arrangement for management, governments power tends to 
dominate the outcome. But the Adat institution, a common 
phenomenon for forest management in Indonesia, has been 
implemented as such. As many people consider the Adat 
institutions to be successful, it can be (at least) recommended 
to take into account the existing traditional systems for the 
implementation of resource management. As Yami et al. 
(2009) explained: ‘policies and development interventions 
should strengthen the involvement of well-functioning 
informal institutions in decision-making, so that sustainable 
CPR management can be achieved’. The ultimate outcome of 
interactions and exchanges in the local institutions depends on 
the place-specific bio-physical environment, the preferences 
and roles of all relevant actors as determined by the specific 
socio-economic context, and the dynamics of local institutional 
arrangements. The original eight principles still have much 
value, as a quick practical set of tools.
We did not investigate the relationship between the Adat 
institution and current modernisation tendencies in detail. 
Nevertheless, weakening of the traditional institutions in 
modern times is a strong trend, and modern life is attractive 
to most of the youth. The power of the Adat leaders is not 
anymore taken for granted by anyone, although integration 
in the formal system brings some compensation. If the 
leaders did not gain any power in the formal state regulation 
system, Adat leaders probably would have been just as 
toothless as they were in the beginning of the ‘reformasi’. 
At the same time, government officials alone can also not 
do the (enforcement) job. The Adat, with its implicit design 
principles, gives this legitimacy to its leaders; it might be the 
main factor for the success of the present institutionalisation. 
The challenge now is to modernise the Adat institution 
without losing their importance for sustainability in managing 
commons. Special attention is required for the possibility 
that the full community can participate in the Adat activities. 
Furthermore, local leaders add legitimacy, but they also bring 
the risk of corruption, when personal interests are mixed with 
community interests. Again, we did not find any indication of 
this within the research, but one must be aware that it could 
lead to unethical enforcement of sustainability rules. We hope 
that by mentioning this point, we show its importance for future 
studies of indigenous communities and sustainability of CPRs.
Based on the perceptions of the community respondents 
in ‘Herman Yohannes Grand Forest Park’, most of the 
design principles were present in the functioning of its Adat 
institutions. Accordingly, it even seems that the presence of 
the design principles contributed to the sustainability of the 
forests over centuries, irrespective of the dynamics in regimes 
on a higher level of scale in governance. In this respect, 
the findings add argumentation to the original eight design 
principles for long term sustainability of CPRs as stated by 
Ostrom (1990).  
At a later date McGinnis and Ostrom (2010) presented the 
fully developed dual design principles, in alignment with 
Ostrom’s recent works on multi-tier framework to analyse 
social-ecological systems, known as the SES Framework 
(Ostrom, 2007). Studies as ours could be taken to the next 
level, with an analysis based on the dual design principles, 
combined with the SES framework. This could further enhance 
our understanding of institutions like the Adat and their 
potential role in sustainable management of CPRs in variable 
contexts. Further research is needed to find answers to these 
important questions.
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Appendix 1
Main actors in the community living in Grand Forest Park ‘Herman Yohannes’ (at the time of study in 2009)
No Name Position in organisation Location
1 Yacob N. Abineno Head of TAIM (Fetor) ASD
2 Elisa Ataupah Secretary of TAIM ASD
3 Petrus Kasse Chief of Sub- TAIM in Kotabes village ASD
4 Eliasar Tuthaen Deputy of TAIM ASD
5 Kornelis Bureran Member of TAIM ASD
6 Ferdinan Bani Member of Tateut Pah Nekmese, South ASD
7 Kusnawi Y. Bani Chief of Forest Guarding Group Tateut Pah Nekmese, South ASD
8 Semuel Yendri Lada, S.Hut Staff of Forest Guarding section in Forestry Board East Nusa Tenggara Province Kupang city
9 Eduar AR. Theedens, SH Chief of Forest Guarding section in Forestry Board East Nusa Tenggara Province Kupang city
10 Joni Tabun Forest Guard Amarasi ASD
11 Welhemus Lomu Niffu Amarasi Sub District Leader ASD
12 Apolos Nutbais Secretary of Amarasi Sub District ASD
TAIM: The Adat Institution Manekat, ASD: Amarasi Sub District
